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abstract 
Secrecy, especially state secrecy, has taken on increasing interest for scholars of international 
relations and security studies.  However, even with interest in secrecy on the rise, there has 
been little explicit attention to exposure.  The breaking of secrecy has generally been 
UHOHJDWHGWRWKHUROHRIDPHUH³VZLWFK´ZKRVHLQWHUQDOZRUNLQJVDQGYDULDWLRQVDUHRIOLWWOH
consequence.  This article argues that exposure is a significant process in its own right, and 
introduces a new conceptualization of exposure as a socially and politically constructed 
SURFHVVRQHWKDWPXVWEH³WKLFNO\GHVFULEHG´ if we are to understand how it occurs and has 
effects.  I differentiate the process of exposure into two distinct aspects, reserving the concept 
of exposure to refer to releases of information, while introducing the concept of revelation to 
refer to a collective recognition that something has been exposed.  The first part of the paper 
explores existing understandings of secrecy and exposure to demonstrate why a new 
framework is needed, while the second part applies this framework to a case study of the 
exposure of the use of torture in the post-86³ZDURQWHUURU´ 
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Introduction 
Secrecy, especially state secrecy, has taken on increasing interest for scholars of 
international relations and security studies in recent years (e.g. Aldrich & Moran, 2019; 
Colaresi, 2014; Rittberger & Goetz, 2018; Sagar, 2013).  The study of secrecy has also been 
revitalized by the emergence of a critical interdisciplinary literature on secrecy and 
transparency (e.g. Balmer, 2012; Birchall, 2011a; Capozzola, 2010; Horn, 2011; Masco, 
2010; McCarthy & Fluck, 2017; Paglen, 2010; Wellerstein, 2008).  However, even with 
interest in secrecy on the rise, there has been little explicit attention to exposure, or the 
breaking of secrecy, which has generally been relegated to the role of a mere ³switch,´ whose 
internal workings and variations are of little consequence.  This article argues that exposure is 
a process of significance in its own right, and introduces a new conceptualization of exposure 
as a socially and politically constructed process, one tKDWPXVWEH³WKLFNO\GHVFULEHG´ (Geertz, 
2000) if we are to understand how it occurs and has effects.  In drawing out the process of 
H[SRVXUH,DOVRVKRZWKDWERWK³VHFUHF\´DQG³openness´DUHPRUHcomplex than generally 
thought. 
7KLVSDSHUIRFXVHVSDUWLFXODUO\RQWKHH[SRVXUHRIVWDWHVHFUHWVWKDW³FRYHUXS´QRUP
violations.  In so doing, however, it argues that we need to reconceptualize exposure as not 
simply an uncovering of hidden information, but a collective transformation of meaning.  
Understandings of exposure, in both academic work and in practical politics, are often 
modelled upon an implicit theory of power and knowledge, in which information is 
conceptualized as largely apolitical and self explanatory: what Fenster (2015; 2017) calls the 
³F\EHUQHWLF´PRGHORILQIRUPDWLRQFurther, much scholarship on secrecy and openness 
incorporates a particular normative and agentic understanding of the public, as an audience 
that can, first, absorb information without need for debate or interpretation, second, that has 
largely benign intentions guided by liberal democratic norms, and third, is able to effectively 
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take action in response to information (Dean, 2002).  These assumptions help to explain why 
PXFKRIWKHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUHYLHZVH[SRVXUHDQLQVWDQWDQHRXV³VZLWFK´UDWKHUWKDQD
process requiring interpretive work.   
A similar framework frequently underlies advocacy for openness in politics.  
Normative work, in both theory and practice, is often premised upon an underlying set of 
assumptions about the relationship between secrecy, exposure, and consequences, which 
presumes that when state secrecy, especially that relating to norm violations, is disrupted by 
exposure, this then leads straightforwardly to accountability (here understood as the process 
through which a state realigns its public actions to align with its stated normative 
commitments).  Although recent work (e.g. Carnegie & Carson, 2018; Fenster, 2017; Lester, 
2015; Lord, 2016) has established that exposure does not always lead to desired 
consequences, such works tend to focus on structural relations of power (Carnegie & Carson, 
2018) or the substantive content of what is exposed (Lord, 2016) as the key variable, rather 
than analyzing the  process of exposure and how it unfolds as itself a key mechanism.    
This paper introduces a new conceptual framework for analyzing exposure as a 
process, differentiating it into two distinct aspects.  It reserves the concept of exposure to 
refer to instances of making information publicly available, while introducing the concept of 
revelation to refer to a collective recognition that there has been a significant change in what 
is publicly known.  It argues that the shift from exposure to revelation results from the 
combination of new information and a collective process of meaning making.  Revelation 
generally results from exposure, but not all exposures lead to revelations.  In developing this 
reconceptualization, I build upon recent work in critical interdisciplinary secrecy studies, as 
well as a tradition in historical sociology that emphasizes the importance of analyzing events 
as socially and politically contentious processes, rather than simply momentary occurrences 
(Clemens, 2007; Sewell, 1996; Steinmetz, 2004).  The first part of this paper explores 
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existing understandings of secrecy and exposure in order to demonstrate why a new 
framework is needed, while the second part demonstrates the usefulness and applicability of 
this framework by applying it to a case study of the exposure of the use of torture in the post-
9/11 U.S. war on terror. 
Models of secrecy and exposure, in theory and practice 
That states will keep secrets, particularly when security is at stake, is practically a 
given in the study of international politics (e.g. Colaresi, 2014; Krasner, 1999; Mearsheimer, 
2011; Rittberger & Goetz, 2018; Walters, 2015).  It is generally presumed that states, if 
engaging in practices that violate international norms, will operate with secrecy and denial as 
³WKHQRUPDOVWDWHRIDIIDLUV´(Cohen, 2001).  Empirical research on secrecy and transparency 
tends to focus on questions such as when states and other collective actors do (or do not) 
engage in secrecy, and what conditions enable secrecy to be successfully maintained (e.g. 
Aftergood, 2010; Colaresi, 2014; Galison, 2004; Gibbs, 1995; Gibson, 2014; Hilgartner, 
2012; Worthy, 2017).    
Normatively oriented work, meanwhile, tends to assume that secrecy is 
antidemocratic and works to prevent accountability- or the ability of publics to hold states to 
task when they violate their stated values (Thomas, 2019; Thompson, 1999).  It thus tends to 
focus on the question of under what limited circumstances secrecy might be justified (e.g. 
Bellaby, 2019; Sagar, 2013).  6HFUHF\KDV³DFTXLUHGDEDGUHSXWDWLRQ´DQGFRPHWREHOLQNHG
ZLWK³SROLWLFDOFULPHRUFRUUXSWLRQ´(Horn, 2011: 103).  It LVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHVWDWH¶VDELOLW\
to inflate threats (Masco, 2010), engage in corruption, commit atrocities (Setty, 2017), and is 
YLHZHGDV³LQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKGHPRFUDWLFGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJLQREYLRXVZD\V´(Aftergood, 
2010: 839).  Transparency and openness, meanwhile, are valorized, with this valuation 
sometimes traced through a long line of enlightenment philosophical thinking, from Kant, 
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Rousseau, and Bentham (Jones, 2014: 54; McCarthy & Fluck, 2017: 417-418; Worthy, 2017: 
7), through to the contemporary work of Habermas (1989 (1962)) and his followers.  Even in 
the realm of security, where the need for state secrecy is most likely to be seen as legitimate, 
it is frequently viewed with a degree of suspicion, while transparency and openness are seen 
DV³DYLUWXHWKHVHFXODUYHUVLRQRIDERUQ-DJDLQFOHDQOLQHVVWKDWIHZFDQIDLOWRSUDLVH´
(Birchall, 2011a: 8).   
Thus, while work on secrecy in mainstream IR and security studies tends to focus on 
VWDWHV¶PRWLYDWLRQVIRUVHFUHF\DQGWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVXQGHUZKLFKVHFUHF\LV, or should be, 
maintained, there is little attention to exposure as a significant process in itself.  In the 
following section, I show that advocacy for openness in practice tends to rely upon a 
similarly limited framework, wherein exposure acts as a straightforward switch to openness, 
with exposure of state secrets expected to lead straightforwardly to accountability.  I do this 
through an examination of advocacy for transparency and exposure in fields ranging from 
journalism and activism, to institutionalized practices of states and the international 
community.    
Expectations of transparency were broadly institutionalized as tools for state 
accountability in the latter half of the 20th century.  In the U.S., dramatic exposures of state 
corruption and wrongdoing led to the institutionalization of expectations for government 
transparency (Olmstead, 1996), with the 1966 ³)UHHGRPRI,QIRUPDWLRQ$FW´SURYLGLQJD
(limited) right of the public and journalists to request access to government records, while the 
³6XQVKLQH$FW,´ introduced in 1972 and signed into law in 1976, mandated open access to 
official records.  The U.S. would become a worldwide frontrunner in legislating transparency 
(Schudson, 2015), with expectations of transparency becoming embedded into political 
practice more widely via popular movements, journalism, advocacy, and institutional laws 
and practices.  This has been FKDUDFWHUL]HGDVD³FXUUHQWJOREDOUHVRQDQFHRIWURSHVRI
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WUDQVSDUHQF\DVDXQLYHUVDOO\GHVLUDEOHTXDOLW\RURUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQV´ (Jones, 2014: 
56), resulting in a situation in which, ³ZLWKWKHEDFNLQJRIDµmovement¶, transparency 
assumed the position of an unassailable µgood¶´(Birchall, 2011b: 60).    
A similar valorization of exposure underlies a strain of political practice whose 
lineage can be traced from the muckraking journalists of the early twentieth century to 
contemporary projects such as Wikileaks, whose enactors conceptualized their potential 
impact based upon a belief that ³ILUVW. . .one could reach transparency, and second, that 
transparency, by the mere fact of existing, will be the best guarantee for a democratic power 
and a IUHHVRFLHW\´(Estop, 2014: 40).  Recent works by journalists of the national security 
state evince a similar approach:  Glenn Greenwald, writing about whistleblower Edward 
Snowden, declares: ³6HFUHF\LVWKHOLQFKSLQRIDEXVHRISRZHULWVHQDEOLQJIRUFH
Transparency is the only real antidote" (2014: 12), while Scott Horton, in Lords of Secrecy, 
FDVWVVHFUHF\DV³KLJKO\FRUURVLYHWRDQ\GHPRFUDF\´(2015: 17), and Priest and Arkin 
(2011) bemoan the rise of a new ³Top Secret America,´ whose existence enables illegal and 
XQDFFRXQWDEOHDFWLRQV'DQLHO(OOVEHUJEHVWNQRZQIRUKLVUROHLQOHDNLQJWKH³3HQWDJRQ
3DSHUV´GXULQJWKH9LHWQDP:DUUHFDOOVLQKLVPHPRLUSecrets, that:  
"As I observed the effect of this leak, it was if clouds had suddenly opened.  I realized 
something crucial: that the president's ability to escalate, his entire strategy 
throughout the war, had depended on secrecy and lying and thus on his ability to deter 
unauthorized disclosures--truth telling--E\RIILFLDOV´(Ellsberg, 2002: 204). 
In each of these examples, there is an underlying assumption that exposure of state secrets 
will lead directly to openness and accountability.   
Although this paper focuses on developments in the U.S., these have inspired a spate 
of similar transparency initiatives elsewhere, through an international ³transparency 
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movement´DQGRUJDQL]DWLRQVVXFKDV7UDQVSDUHQF\,QWHUQDWLRQDODQGWKH6XQOLJKW
Foundation (Birchall, 2011a: 11).  Presumptions of the necessity, and effectiveness, of 
transparency and exposure underlie many of our contemporary systems of global governance, 
including international agreements seen as maintaining international peace and order and 
international rights, such as treaties protecting human rights and regulating the use of nuclear 
DQGRWKHU³ZHDSRQVRIPDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ´ (Sikkink, 2011; Walker, 2007).  Here secrecy is 
generally viewed as a key barrier to democratic decision making and accountability, while 
openness, in the form of transparency and exposure, is conceptualized as the framework that 
allows publics to hold states to their proclaimed values, whether domestically or in the 
international community (Fenster, 2017).  
Advocates of human rights and other protective norms also frequently assume that 
states, at least liberal democratic states, have an interest in reputation management that will 
drive them to conceal their worst actions (Clark, 2001; Dezalay & Garth, 2006; Iriye, Goedde 
& Hitchcock, 2012; Keck & Sikkink, 1998).  And it is presumed, or at least hoped, that the 
rise of international laws, and concrete forms of sanction such as prosecutions in the 
International Criminal Court, will act as a deterrent to states (Sikkink, 2011).  Given the 
common presumption that states have incentives to lie about actions that violate international 
agreements, it follows that current practices, from inspections of weapons sites to the reports 
on human rights violations compiled by groups such as Amnesty International, mandate 
transparency, and support organized practices of exposure, in order to sustain an international 
order based upon shared norms and values (McCarthy & Fluck, 2017).  In both domestic and 
international spheres, expectations of transparency, and threats of exposure, have thus been 
framed and institutionalized as a means of accountability. 
A key difficulty, however, is that these dominant approaches to thinking about 
secrecy and openness tend to be premised upon a valorization of transparency that assumes it 
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just works.  A largely unspoken theory of knowledge and politics provides the logic 
undergirding this relationship: that state secrecy, once exposed, will lead to accountability.  
This entails underdeveloped theories of both information, and the public, with both lacking a 
sufficiently developed theory of the relation between power and knowledge.  It assumes that 
information is neutral, lacking D³SROLWLFV´ beyond being enclosed, or not, and will become 
immediately available for action once released.  Underlying such a model of action is a 
theory of change that presumes a particular model of agency for the public, that has an 
interest and ability to effectively act upon information, once it is available.  I propose that a 
more developed theory of exposure may be able to diagnose what happens when exposure 
occurs, and under what conditions it may or may not achieve its goals.  The next section 
argues that we can marshal insights from the new interdisciplinary literature of secrecy to 
address some of the shortcomings in traditional theories of secrecy and exposure.   
This new literature argues that secrecy should be understood not simply as the 
withholding or blocking of information, but as a complex set of social relations.  
Contributions to this literature have often focused on understanding secrecy and visibility are 
complex, multilayered phenomena (Horn, 2013; Van Veeren, 2018) and conceptualizing 
secrecy as a practice, enumerating the tensions and difficulties through which states of 
³VHFUHF\´DQG³RSHQQHVV´DUHPDLQWDLQHG (Masco, 2010; Paglen, 2010; Van Veeren, 2014).  
Drawing upon multiple disciplines, including science studies, anthropology, and geography, 
authors in this approach argue that we should analyze secrecy and transparency not as a 
binary set of opposites, but as intimately related or even co-constituted (e.g. Birchall, 2011a; 
Birchall, 2011b; Bratich, 2007; Horn, 2011).   
Drawing upon work in science and technology studies that argues knowledge, 
evidence, and facts are always both social and material accomplishments (e.g. Latour, 1987; 
Poovey, 1998), authors have critiqued a so-called ³F\EHUQHWLF´RU³LQIRUPDWLRQPRGHO´  
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within mainstream approaches to secrecy, wherein exposure is equated simply with bringing 
information to persons or publics who lack it, with the underlying assumption that the 
information exposed was not already publicly known, and that exposure itself will lead to 
consequences/ change/ action (Fenster, 2015: 152).  A key component of this approach is the 
critique of knowledge as ³LQIRUPDWLRQ´whose meaning is self-evident, requiring no political 
or social interpretation, imagining that WUXWKVLPSO\H[LVWV³RXWWKHUH´'HDQ.  While 
transparency is widely conceptualized as neutral, technical, or apolitical (Birchall, 2014), this 
ostensible apoliticality obscures the role of political action and interpretation in making 
LQIRUPDWLRQ³NQRZDEOH´DQGDYDLODEOHIRUDFWLRQZKLOHDUHODWHGFULWLTXHWDUJHWVD³YLVLRQRI
UDGLFDOWUDQVSDUHQF\´LQZKLFKWKHUHOHDVHRILQIRUPDWLRQDXWRPDWLFDOO\OHDGVWRSROLWLFDO
change (Roberts, 2012: 121).  Research has often focused on thick descriptions of how 
secrecy operates as a set of relations or practices, with secrecy conceptualized not as simply 
the blacking out of information, but as set of practices and social relations that make 
knowledge accessible, shareable, or inarticulable in certain circumstances but not others (e.g. 
Aradau, 2017; De Goede & Wesseling, 2017; Gusterson, 1996; Kearns, 2016; Masco, 2002; 
Paglen, 2010; Van Veeren, 2014; Walters, 2015).  Literature in this vein often focuses on 
analyzing how secrecy occurs, and what it looks like in practice, rather than practical 
questions of whether the state can keep information from the public, or normative questions 
about whether it ought to do so. 
However, even in this new secrecy literature, little attention has been paid to 
disruption and change²including processes such as exposure and revelation, through which 
WKH³VHFUHW´DQGWKH³SXEOLF´are transformed.  I thus build upon this literature by developing 
a new conceptual framework for the analysis of exposure as a process.  In the following 
section, I apply this framework to an analysis of the process though which the use of torture 
by the U.S. in the war on terror came to be known.  In so doing, I demonstrate the usefulness 
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of a framework in which exposure is conceptualized not as a single moment of information 
release, but as a process that occurs over time.  This case study also highlights the key role of 
interpretation: the (often contentious) process of making sense of information, and of relating 
it to existing public discourse.  The answers to questions such as: ³what counts as an 
exposure"´ ³when does exposure begin"´, and ³when has an exposure occurred"´ are neither 
obvious but rather contentious and contingent.1  I break down the process of exposure into 
two component parts: releases of information, or, colloquially, moments of exposure; and 
revelation, or a collective recognition that something new has come to be publicly known.  
This is not to suggest that exposure necessarily occurs as a linear process, moving in an 
orderly fashion from one step to the next.  Nor am I proposing to have discovered a universal 
model of how exposure works: this would be contrary to my central claim that exposure is a 
variable process.  Rather, I introduce a set of conceptual tools that may be assembled in 
multiple ways in order to analyze any particular case, and which may serve as the basis for 
future work that aims to analyze or compare broader patterns of exposure across time and 
space.   
Exposing American Torture 
By the end of the twentieth century, the principle of respect for human rights was 
almost universally acknowledged, with the prohibition of torture, in particular, having 
attained a settled, almost sacred, status, as the most fundamental of these rights  (Ignatieff, 
2003; Shue, 2006; Sutton & Norgaard, 2013).  This is not to say that no states engaged in 
torture, only that it was presumed that any states daring to break the norm would keep it 
secret, and that it would be rare to find open acknowledgement of the practice (Gordon, 2014; 
Luban, 2014).  The U.S. was here no exception, with America's 1999 report to the UN 
 
1
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the significance of these questions.  
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Committee Against Torture proclaiming that, "torture is prohibited by law throughout the 
United States.  It is categorically denounced as a matter of policy and as a tool of state 
DXWKRULW\´DVTXRWHGLQ6LNNLQN-7).  As we now know, however, only two years 
after this proclamation to the U.N., the U.S. made ongoing, planned, and formally authorized 
use of torture in the war on terror (Bassiouni, 2006; Danner, 2004; Greenberg, 2006; Hajjar, 
2013; McCoy, 2006; Raphael et al., 2016).  This section explores the process of how 
information about this use of torture entered the public sphere, DQGKRZWKH³UHYHODWLRQ´WKDW
the U.S. was engaging in torture emerged.   
It is commonly presumed that the use of torture in the war on terror was first exposed 
by the Abu Ghraib scandal, precipitated by the airing, in April 2004, of photos depicting 
abuse and torture of prisoners by American soldiers at the Iraqi prison.  However, it is not the 
case that the use of torture by the U.S. in the war on terror was, prior to this scandal, entirely 
unknown.  And I am not referring here simply to rumors, whispers, or reports circulated to 
limited readerships, but to material published in mainstream national newspapers.  American 
torture, both before (Harbury, 2005; McCoy, 2006; Otterman, 2007; Rejali, 2009), but 
especially after, 9/11, is better understood as a public secret (Taussig, 1999), rather than 
something strictly unknown.  In the interest of using a conservatively circumscribed 
understanding of when inforPDWLRQKDVEHFRPH³SXEOLF´WKLVFDVHVWXG\relies primarily on 
material published in the two most prominent national newspapers in the U.S.: The New York 
Times and the Washington Post.   
Information suggesting U.S. use of torture in the war on terror was made public 
repeatedly, through a wide variety of modes, including hints, leaks, investigative journalism, 
whistleblowing, allegations and accusations, well prior to the release of the Abu Ghraib 
photos.  I trace here some of the key instances through which information about the use of 
torture was made publicly available between September 2001 and April 2004, and show that 
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these did not lead in a direct or linear fashion to a revelation.  On the contrary, these multiple 
LQVWDQFHVRI³H[SRVXUH´generally failed to coalesce into a shared understanding that torture 
was occurring, or indeed WKDWDQ\WKLQJRIVLJQLILFDQFHKDGEHHQ³revealed´DWDOO,QVWHDG
what resulted, at least for much of 2002 and 2003, was a fractured and contradictory public 
discourse in which acknowledgements of specific torture techniques coexisted with denials 
that torture was being used.    
Soon after the September 11th attacks, hints of unorthodox interrogation methods 
began to appear.  In one of the earliest such instances, Vice President Dick Cheney, appearing 
RQ1%&¶V³0HHWWKH3UHVV´RQ6HSWHPEHU suggested the U.S. might need to turn to 
the ³GDUNVLGH´to fight terrorism.2  Throughout the remainder of 2001, debates over how 
terrorist suspects should be treated, and potential interrogation methods, such as sleep 
GHSULYDWLRQDQG³stress positions,´ were freely discussed in the press.  Public 
acknowledgements of practices previously classed as torture--including sleep deprivation, 
caging, secret disappearances and renditions to countries known to use torture, withholding of 
pain medications, and waterboarding² appeared throughout 2002 and 2003.  And yet, even 
as they continued to accumulate, these ³H[SRVXUHV´failed to coalesce into a collective 
recognition that the U.S. was engaging in torture.  
The path to revelation, or the collective acknowledgement that secrets have been 
exposed, is thus not simply a linear additive process.  This can be further illustrated through 
the emergence of two paired modes of talking about prisoner treatment:  the emergence of 
evidence regarding the use of specific interrogation techniques that would, in other 
circumstances, have been labeled torture, paired with denials that these practices actually 
constituted torture.  This pattern took off following the April 2002 capture of Abu Zubaydah, 
 
2
 Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001) transcript: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/newsspeeches/speeches/vp20010916.html 
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named DVELQ/DGHQ¶V³OLHXWHQDQW´by the U.S. government.  Although his capture was 
heralded by official assertions that torture would not be used, these assertions often appeared 
directly alongside explicit discussions of the (supposedly non-torture) tactics that would be 
used, including sleep deprivation and ³psychological´ techniques.  For example, on April 4, 
2002, the New York Times reported on 6HFUHWDU\RI'HIHQVH'RQDOG5XPVIHOG¶VVWDWHPHQWVDW
a press conference that  
³DOWKRXJK0U=XED\GDK¶VLQWHUURJDWRUVZRXOGHYHQWXDOO\GUDZµevery single thing 
out of him¶ that might head off terrorist acts, the questioners would not resort to 
WRUWXUHµ+H will be properly interrogated by proper people who know how to do 
these things,¶0U5XPVIHOGVDLGGLVPLVVLQJUHSRUWVWKDW0U=XED\GDKPLJKWEHVHQW
WRDWKLUGFRXQWU\WKDWHPSOR\HGWRUWXUHPHWKRGV´(Johnston, 2002).  
Later that same month, The New York Times would report that Zubaydah was being subjected 
WR³QRQYLROHQWIRUPVRIFRHUFLRQLQFOXGLQJVOHHSGHSULYDWLRQDQGDYDULHW\RISV\FKRORJLFDO
techniques that arHPHDQWWRLQVSLUHIHDU´ (Shenon, 2002).  Simultaneously, however, 
sometimes reported in these same articles, the Bush administration was asserting that Abu 
Zubaydah would not be subjected to torture, with an emphasis on the professionalism and 
effectiveness of interrogators (Johnston, 2002; Shenon, 2002; Shenon & Risen, 2002). 
As time passed, this approach²of admitting the use of specific interrogation 
techniques, while denying that these methods constituted torture²persisted.  On June 16, 
2002, the New York Times published what seems to be their first piece explicitly questioning 
whether the U.S. was using torture (Schmitt, 2002).  Titled, ³There are ways to make them 
WDON´LWQRWHGWKDW$PHULFDQRIILFLDOVKDGDQQRXQFHGWKDWWKH\KDGEURNHQXSDSORWIRUDVR-
FDOOHG³GLUW\ERPE´EDVHGXSRQLQIRUPDWLRQWKH\KDGREWDLQHGIURP$EX=XED\GDK using 
this event to open up the question of how officials were obtaining intelligence from prisoners, 
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and linking this a public debate on the permissibility of torture that had emerged since the 
9/11 attacks.   
³6LQFH6HSWHPEHUWKHUHKDVEHHQVRPHSXElic discussion in this country of 
whether torture would be justified if it produced information that could save 
American lives. . . Military officials say torture is not an option. But, they said, under 
the Geneva Conventions, anything short of torture is permissible. . . µ:HGRQ¶WEHDW
people with rubber hoses,¶VDLGDVHQLRUPLOLWDU\RIILFLDOIDPLOLDUZLWKLQWHUURJDWLRQ
WHFKQLTXHVµWKDW¶VQRWKRZZHGREXVLQHVV¶´(Schmitt, 2002).   
This RIILFLDO¶VFODLPVWKDW³ZHGRQ¶WEHDWSHRSOHZLWKUXEEHUKRVHV´here frames torture as 
something that only unsophisticated, uncivilized people do, and poses a contrast to the sorts 
of techniques whose use had been admitted at this point, such as sleep deprivation, 
withholding of food, and psychological manipulation.  The suggestion is that these techniques 
are scientific, effective, and precisely applied, and therefore not torture, which should be 
reserved for unregulated, brutal, or sadistic practices.  This distinction between clean, 
professional, ³interrogation,´ DQGEUXWDO³WRUWXUH´KDVDFOHDUUHVRQDQFHZLWKDQRULHQWDOLVW
QRWLRQRIWKH86DVD³FLYLOL]HG´DFWRUZKRVHDFWLRQVDUHDOPRVWE\GHILQLWLRQEHQLJQZKLOH
UHVLJQLQJ³WRUWXUH´DVVRPHWKLQJWKDWRQO\RFFXUVLQ³RWKHUHG´FRQWH[WV(Mokhtari, 2009; 
Said, 1978). 
The public debate following the March 2003 capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 
named in the 9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004: 
145) DVWKH³SULQFLSDODUFKLWHFWRIWKHDWWDFNV´HFKRHGWKDWIROORZLQJWKHFDSWXUHRI$EX
Zubaydah the year previous, with similar patterns of paired acknowledgement and denial.  A 
report in the New York TimesZKLOHWLWOHG³Questioning to Be Legal, Humane and 
$JJUHVVLYH7KH:KLWH+RXVH6D\V´DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDW   
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"In seeking information from Qaeda members, the United States has deprived 
suspects of sleep and light, kept them in awkward physical positions for hours and 
used psychological intimidation or deception to confuse and disorient them, official 
said" (Lichtblau, 2003). 
This article further includes official acknowledgements that US interrogators have withheld 
pain medication from injured prisoners, and rendered suspects to countries known to use 
torture (Lichtblau, 2003). 
,QSHUKDSVWKHPRVWGUDPDWLFH[DPSOHRIDFOHDU³H[SRVXUH´WKDW\HWIDLOHGWRUHVXOWLQ
a revelation (or public acknowledgment that significant exposures had occurred), a front-page 
story in the Washington Post, published on December 26, 2002, included explicit quotes from 
American officials acknowledging that prisoners were being subjected to practices equivalent 
WRWRUWXUH$Q³RIILFLDOZKRKDVVXSHUYLVHGWKHFDSWXUHDQGWUDQVIHURIDFFXVHGWHUURULVWV´
declared, "If you don't violate someone's human rights some of the time, you probably aren't 
doing your job" (Priest & Gellman, 2002).  $QRWKHU³RIILFLDOZKRKDVEHHQGLUHFWO\LQYROYHG
LQUHQGHULQJFDSWLYHVLQWRIRUHLJQKDQGV´WROGUHSRUWHUVWKDW:HGRQ
WNLFNWKH>H[SOHWLYH@
out of them. We send them to other countries so they FDQNLFNWKH>H[SOHWLYH@RXWRIWKHP´
(Priest & Gellman, 2002).  And Cofer Black, then head of the CIA Counterterrorist Center, 
WROGDUHSRUWHUWKDW³7KHUHZDVDEHIRUHDQGWKHUHZDVDQDIWHU$IWHUWKH
JORYHVFRPHRII´ (Priest & Gellman, 2002).  Yet, although this piece contained some of the 
most explicit acknowledgements of the use of torture to date, it had relatively little impact.  
Instead the allegations came to be treated as mere hints, and were eventually absorbed into 
the general ongoing narrative of U.S. practices as perhaps ³harsh interrogation,´ but certainly 
not ³torture.´ 
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Despite these repeated releases of information, it was not until the broadcast of the 
Abu Ghraib photos that there was a revelation, or collective recognition, that torture was 
being used.  How DQGZK\GLGWRUWXUHEHFRPHSXEOLFO\³NQRZQ´RQO\LQ$SULO"The 
XVXDOFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRIH[SRVXUHDVD³VZLWFK´IURPVHFUHF\WRRSHQQHVVLVXQDEOHWR
explain why, among multiple instances of exposure (or release of information), only the Abu 
*KUDLESKRWRVSURYRNHGD³UHYHODWLRQ´7KHXVXDODQVZHUKHUHLVWKDWWKLVLQVWDQFHZDV
unique insofar as it offered photographic, and not merely textual, evidence, and that images 
are more powerful and disruptive than mere words, and photographic evidence is less 
deniable than textual reporting (Del Rosso, 2015).  Although this is surely part of the answer, 
the Abu Ghraib photos were not the first photos depicting torture of war on terror prisoners: 
for example, on May 30 2003, a British soldier "was arrested. . . after he left a roll of film at a 
SKRWRVWRUHWKDWDSSHDUHGWRVKRZDQ,UDTLSULVRQHUEHLQJWRUWXUHG´ (Alvarez, 2003).  So it 
cannot be the mere existence of photographs that turns an exposure into a revelation.   
The Abu Ghraib photos did not simply provide depictions of torture.  They also 
fundamentally disrupted the ways in which torture had been conceptualized in the post-9/11 
public debate.  They presented stark visual evidence that contradicted official attempts to 
depict the treaWPHQWRISULVRQHUVLQFOXGLQJWKRVHWDUJHWHGIRU³KDUVKLQWHUURJDWLRQ´DVKLJKO\
regulated, professionally carried out, and performed with measured, cool, effectiveness.  
These pictures thus EHOLHGWKH³P\WKRIWKHLQVWUXPHQWDOXVHRIWRUWXUH´(Richter-Montpetit, 
2014: 45), providing instead highly sensationalized images of American soldiers who seemed 
to take pleasure in imposing sexualized humiliations upon their prisoners.  
That the ³UHYHODWLRQ´RUFROOHFWLYHDFNQRZOHGJHPHQW of the use of torture in the war 
on terror occurred only after the release of the Abu Ghraib photos, and not in response to any 
RIWKHSUHYLRXV³H[SRVXUHV´must be understood by placing these exposures within the 
context of an ongoing debate about the ethical and legal permissibility of torture that 
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permeated American public discourse since 9/11.  Despite claims that human rights, and 
particularly the prohibition on torture, had taken on a sacred, almost unspeakable, status by 
the end of the twentieth century (e.g. Ignatieff, 2003), debates about torture, including 
advocacy for its use, were pervasive in the aftermath of 9/11.  A public debate on the ethical 
and legal permissibility of torture began to take shape in the U.S. just weeks after 9/11 
(Brooks & Manza, 2013; Del Rosso, 2015; Gordon, 2014; Greenberg, 2006; Hajjar, 2013; 
Levinson, 2004; Porpova et al., 2013; Zegart, 2012).  Furthermore, advocacy for the use of 
torture, or at least its consideration, was not the sole province of partisan outlets such as Fox 
News or right-wing talk radio.  On the contrary, many of the most prominent figures raising 
the question styled themselves as liberals and were published in the mainstream media (e.g. 
Alter, 2001).  Popular magazines such as Newsweek, The Atlantic, and The Economist 
published cover stories arguing for and against, and a number of prominent philosophers and 
lawyers came out publicly in favor of its permissibility (Greenberg, 2006; Gross, 2004; 
Levinson, 2004; McCoy, 2006: 178).  
From September 2001 through March 2004, the public discourse on the use of 
interrogational torture in the war on terror followed two largely parallel strands.  Alongside 
the periodic exposures and fractured acknowledgements and denials shaping the debate over 
the nature of the actual treatment of prisoners, there was what I call DQ³DEVWUDFW´ethical 
debate around the question of whether the U.S. ought to torture terrorist suspects.  This 
debate frequently centered around the so-FDOOHG³WLFNLQJWLPHERPE´QDUUDWLYHLQZKLFKWKH
TXHVWLRQLVSRVHGLIDSULVRQHUVKRXOGEHWRUWXUHGLQRUGHUWROHDUQWKHORFDWLRQRID³WLFNLQJ
ERPE´,QWKHFRQWH[WRIWKLVVFHQDULRLWLVJHQHUDOO\DVVXPHGWKDWWRUWXUHLVVDIH
professional, and effective:  in other words, that the only question is about whether or not it 
might sometimes be permissible to use torture, and not whether torture is an effective avenue 
to gaining information.  
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In its initial form, which emerged shortly after September 11, 2001, this debate was 
largely hypothetical, seemingly taking place under the presumption that torture was not 
already being used.  This was sometimes explicitly stated, as in a November 10, 2001 New 
York Times piece, which GHFODUHGWKDW³:HWUXVWWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDtion is not seriously 
considering torture,´labeling WKLV³DQLGHDWKDWVHHPVPRUHLQWHUHVWLQJWRUDGLRWDONVKRZV
DQGFROXPQLVWVWKDQWRJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOV´ (New York Times, 2001).  This debate over the 
permissibility of torture was also hypothetical in a second sense, insofar as the debate was 
largely framed in terms of an imagined hypothetical scenario, the ³ticking time bomb´ 
narrative.  The details vary in the retelling, but the plot, the characters, and the conclusion 
generally remain the same.  As conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer put it:  
³$WHUURULVWKDVSODQWHGDQXFOHDUERPELQ1HZ<RUN&LW\,WZLOOJRRIILQRQHKRXU
A million people will die.  You capture the terrorist.  He knows where it is.  +H¶VQRW
talking.  Question: If you have the slightest belief that hanging this man by his thumbs 
ZLOOJHW\RXWKHLQIRUPDWLRQWRVDYHDPLOOLRQSHRSOHDUH\RXSHUPLWWHGWRGRLW"´ 
(New York Times, 2005). 
Rather than grappling with the possibility that the U.S. was already torturing prisoners, 
commentators posed this as a moral and legal concern that the country needed to face with 
regard to potential future action.  
7KURXJKRXWWKLV³K\SRWKHWLFDO´SXEOLFGHEDWHWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUWRUWXUHPLJKW
ever be acceptable often turns toward attempts to draw a line between acceptable and 
unacceptable forms of torture and coercion.  This is sometimes made explicit, as in Jonathan 
$OWHU¶VSLHFHWLWOHG³7LPHWR7KLQN$ERXW7RUWXUH´SXEOLVKHGLQWKH1RYHPEHU, 2001 issue 
of Newsweek, which dramatically opens: 
³,QWKLVDXWXPQRIDQJHUHYHQDOLEHUDOFDQILQGKLVWKRXJKWVWXUQLQJWRWRUWXUH2.
not cattle prods or rubber hoses, at least not here in the United States, but something 
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to jump-start the stalled investigation of the greatest crime in American histRU\´ 
(Alter, 2001).   
This opening encompasses the core arguments of the piece:  first, that Americans must begin 
to consider using torture, and second, that it is possible to make a distinction between what 
$OWHUZLOOFRPHWRODEHO³WRUWXUH´WKDWLVEUXWHSK\VLFDOKDUPZKLFKKHXOWLPDWHO\GHHPV
XQDFFHSWDEOHDQG³FRHUFLRQ´ZKLFKhe argues may be necessary (Alter, 2001).     
 ,QWKH³WLFNLQJWLPHERPE´VFHQDULRLWLVJHQHUDOO\DVVXPHGWKDWLVLWSRVVLEOHWRHQDFW
torture in a way that is clean, scientific, and effective.  Alan Dershowitz, one of the most 
prominent public advocates of torture in the aftermath of 9/11, was fond of recommending a 
³VWHULOL]HGQHHGOHXQGHUQHDWKVRPHRQH¶VILQJHUQDLOVWRFDXVHH[FUXFLDWLQJSDLQEXWQRWDIWHU-
HIIHFWV´(National Public Radio, 2006).  In his book, Why Terrorism Works, and in a number 
of op-eds published in papers across the country in 2001 and 2002, Dershowitz argued that 
torture was necessary, and perhaps inevitable, in the fight against terrorism, and that the U.S. 
RXJKWWKHUHIRUHWRLQVWLWXWHDV\VWHPRI³WRUWXUHZDUUDQWV´LQRUGHUWREULQJWKe process under 
legal control (Dershowitz, 2002).  In each of these examples, WKH³WLFNLQJWLPHERPE´DFWVWR
make the permissibility of torture seem like a reasonable option, and shifts the question from 
is torture ever permissible, to what types of coercion are permissible, and under what 
circumstances?    
There is a significant parallel in how torture is conceptualized in these hypothetical 
debates, and in the rhetoric of acknowledgement of specific practices, paired with denial of 
³WRUWXUH´WKDW characterized the news coverage of interrogation practices from late 2001 
through early 2004.   These both tended WRRSSRVHSUHFLVH³FLYLOL]HG´WHFKQLTXHVZLWK
barbaric, excessive ones²WKLQNEDFNWR-RQDWKDQ$OWHU¶VLQYRFDWLRQRI³FDWWOHSURGV´DQG
³UXEEHUhoseV´DVXQacceptable, and, indeed, un-American.  At the same time, however, we 
can observe a striking difference between the official discourse and the hypothetical debate.  
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Where state officials asserted that precisely because the techniques used weUH³QRQYLROHQW´
they are not actually torture, the popular debate makes no such distinction, instead 
distinguishing between brutal, unacceptable, forms of torture and potentially acceptable 
³WRUWXUHOLWH´ (Wolfendale, 2009).  Up until the release of the Abu Ghraib photos, these two 
discourses on torture existed alongside one another, but largely did not intersect:  the abstract 
debate focused upon what we should do, while the concrete debate focused on what was 
actually happening.   
The Abu Ghraib photos did not simply provide visual evidence that corroborated the 
accounts of former prisoners or human rights observers.  They also disrupted the imagined 
abstract vision of interrogational torture as safe, professional, and effective.  The images 
made it undeniable that what was happeniQJZDVQRWWKHUDWLRQDO³FLYLOL]HG´DQGPHDVXUHG
IRUPVRI³HQKDQFHGLQWHUURJDWLRQ´XSRQZKLFKWKHH[LVWLQJGHEDWHRQWKHSHUPLVVLELOLW\RI
torture was predicated, but instead comprised uncontrolled, even sadistic, practices that 
aroused widespread revulsion.3  New York Times columnist Tom Friedman exemplifies this 
response, writing, "I know that tough interrogations are vital in a war against a merciless 
enemy, but outright torture, or this sexual-humiliation-for-HQWHUWDLQPHQWLVDEKRUUHQW´ 
(Friedman, 2004).  3UHVLGHQW%XVKH[SUHVVHG³GHHSGLVJXVW´DWWKHLPDJHV (Shanker, 2004), 
the New York Times wrote that thHSKRWRVGHI\³EDVLFVWDQGDUGVRIKXPDQGHFHQF\´ (New 
York Times, 2004a) and op-eds highlighted the affective aspects of the images, citing 
³JULQQLQJ$PHULFDQVROGLHUVWRUWXULQJ,UDTLSULVRQHUV´DQG³gleefully brutalizing prisoners in 
exactly the manner most horrific to Muslims´(New York Times, 2004b).  In the (UK) Daily 
Telegraph, British politician %RULV-RKQVRQ³referred to female American soldiers 
photographed at Abu Ghraib as 'smirking jezebels from the Appalachians' and went on to ask 
 
3
 7KLVILQGLQJHFKRHV'HO5RVVR¶VREVHUYDWLRQVDERXWWKHFKDUDFWHURIWKHGHEDWHLQWKH&RQJUHVVLRQDO
hearings over the use of torture after Abu Ghraib (Del Rosso, 2015). 
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'How could the American army have been so crass, so arrogant, so brutal as to behave in this 
way?"" (quoted in Cowell, 2004).  All of this was the polar opposite of the kind of detached, 
SURIHVVLRQDOHIIHFWLYH³KDUVKLQWHUURJDWLRQV´SURPLVHGE\RIILFLDOVWKLQNRI5XPVIHOG¶V
SURPLVHWKDWGHWDLQHHVZRXOGEH³µSURSHUO\LQWHUURJDWHGE\SURSHUSHRSOHZKRNQRZKRZWR
GRWKHVHWKLQJV¶´(Johnston, 2002)RUWKH³VHQLRUPLOLWDU\RIILFLDO´ZKRDVVHUWHGWKDW³:H
GRQ¶WEHDWSHRSOHZLWKUXEEHUKRVHV´(Schmitt, 2002)), as well as presumed in the abstract 
ethical debate.   
It was therefore not simply the introduction of photographs, but the way that these 
disrupted existing XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIDNLQGRISURIHVVLRQDOL]HG³WRUWXUHOLWH´, that turned the 
Abu Ghraib photos from an exposure into a revelation.  The photos disrupted the ability to 
continue treating torture as a public secret, rather than an open object of public concern.  A 
key point here is that simply amassing more information, was not sufficient to produce a 
revelation about the use of torture.  Just as conceptualized in the new secrecy literature, the 
³VHFUHW´VWDWXVRIWRUWXUHDIWHULVEHWWHUXQGHUVWRRGDVDVHWRIFRQVWUDLQWVRQKRZLWFRXOG
be known and spoken of, rather than a complete absence of public discourse on the subject.  
Consequently, the process of exposure is better understood as not simply the removal of 
secrecy, but a change in how something can be known, spoken of, and understood. 
The preceding section has thus demonstrated that the question of when and how new 
LQIRUPDWLRQSURGXFHVD³UHYHODWLRQ´FDQQRWEHVLPSO\be understood as the result of 
properties of information itself, but instead must be seen as the outcome of an interpretive 
process.  But just as I have questioned the conceptualization of exposure as an automatic 
³VZLWFK´IURPVHFUHF\WRRSHQQHVV,suggest that we also need to question the assumption of 
a direct link from openness to any particular outcome, such as accountability.  The revelation, 
or collective recognition, that the U.S. had engaged in torture, was not the end, but rather the 
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start of a new cycle of interpretive contention over the meaning and significance of what had 
been revealed.   
The Abu Ghraib photos led to the public revelation that torture had been used.  This 
opened up a debate centered over the relation of the Abu Ghraib abuses to U.S. practices of 
interrogation more generally.  Were the abuses at Abu Ghraib an isolated incident, or were 
they indicative of a more widespread pattern?  Should the use of techniques such as sleep 
GHSULYDWLRQZDWHUERDUGLQJDQG³VWUHVVSRVLWLRQV´DOVREHFRQGHPQHGDVWRUWXUHRUcould 
WKHVHEHFODVVLILHGDVPHUHO\³HQKDQFHGLQWHUURJDWLRQ´"$QGVKRXOGVXFKSUDFWLFHVEH
condemned, or viewed as acceptable, whether or not they were classed as torture?    
Following the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Bush administration took a two-fold tack, 
rhetorically GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJWKHLQFLGHQWVDW$EX*KUDLEIURP³OHJLWLPDWH´XVHVRI³KDUVK
LQWHUURJDWLRQ´ZKLOHGHIHQGLQJWKHXVHRIspecific tactics such as waterboarding.  This 
entailed a new strategy, of not only defending the practices in response to exposures, but also 
actively releasing further information about the program.  In June 2004, just months after the 
DLULQJRIWKHSKRWRVWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQGHFODVVLILHGWKHILUVWVHWRI³WRUWXUHPHPRV´
written by his legal advisers.  In September 2006, President Bush acknowledged the existence 
RI&,$³EODFNVLWHV´ZKHUHSULVRQHUVZHUHVHFUHWO\KHOGDQGKLVDXWKRUL]DWLRQRI
ZDWHUERDUGLQJDQGRWKHU³DOWHUQDWLYH´LQWHUURJDWLRQWDFWLFVZKLFKKHFKDUDFWHUL]HGDV
³WRXJK´³VDIH´³ODZIXO´DQG³QHFHVVDU\´RQQDWLRQDOWHOevision (Hajjar, 2011).  In the 
aftermath of Abu Ghraib we see the state making strategic use of exposures in order to 
generate public support for its (illiberal) activities.  Rather than an idealized process in which 
exposure and revelation enabled the public to hold states to account for their stated values- 
here, a commitment to prevent torture- what we see in this case is instead that exposure and 
revelation resulted in further interpretive conflict over whethHUSUDFWLFHVRI³HQKDQFHG
LQWHUURJDWLRQ´ZHUHMXVWLILHG  While liberal opponents of torture might have wished to see the 
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scandal result in an unambiguous repudiation of torture, the realignment that followed instead 
took the form of yet another interpretive battle, this one over the very definition of torture.   
Conclusion 
This article has argued for a reconceptualization of exposure as a process, in which 
contention over meaning making is central.  It has argued that this process can be analyzed by 
breaking it down into steps, including, crucially, a distinction between exposures, or releases 
of information, and revelation, or a collection recognition that something new has become 
publicly known.  However, this process is contingent- there is no set outcome or direction of 
travel, and not all exposures will lead to revelations.  I have further argued that contestation is 
central to the process of exposure, and that we need to pay attention to not just contestation 
over when and whether information may be released, but, more crucially, contestation over 
what information means.   
I have illustrated the usefulness of this framework by applying it to an analysis of the 
exposure and revelation of the use of torture by the U.S. in the post-9/11 war on terror.   In 
the case of the exposure of the use of torture in the U.S. war on terror, the move from 
³H[SRVXUH´WR³UHYHODWLRQ´HQWDLOHGQRWMXVWWKDWLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHXVHRIVSHFLILF
practices was made public, but that these practices came to be publicly, collectively, 
categorized as torture.  The key question here was not whether specific practices should 
REMHFWLYHO\EHFODVVLILHGDV³WRUWXUH´IRUH[DPSOHE\UHIHUHQFHWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ4 but from 
shifts in collective understanding.  In the case of torture in the war on terror, revelation 
required a new collective understanding that the U.S. had indeed made use of torture²in 
other words, not just that certain techniques had been used, but that these should properly be 
classified as torture. This framework entails two key claims that differentiate it from most 
 
4 Recognizing here that some would argue that law is itself a site of contested, rather than objective, 
meaning (Gunneflo, 2016; Hurd, 2017; Jones, 2016; Kelly, 2012; Stampnitzky, 2016) 
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models of exposure of norm violations: first, that a process of exposure is not simply about 
releasing information that was unknown, and second, that exposure/revelation is less about 
releasing information, and more about a process of making it comprehensible, which always 
entails an interpretive process of relating information to existing discourse. In this case, the 
very question of what kinds of practices count as torture was a key axis of interpretive 
contention, and it was not until information came to light that disrupted existing discourses 
about torture that a revelation could occur.    
This paper has thus highlighted that exposure is an important phenomenon in its own 
right, and provided a set of tools for describing how exposure unfolds in practice.  It has not 
put forth a universal model of exposure, but rather, suggested that the variability of this 
process is itself crucial to understanding it.  This reconceptualization of exposure as a process 
opens up several new potential directions for further research.  First, while this paper has 
focused upon the importance of paying attention to the production of revelation, or the 
collective acknowledgement that something new has come to be publicly known, as a 
contingent process, future work might productively apply a similar approach to the outcomes 
or responses to revelation.  While, as discussed above, it is commonly assumed that 
exposures lead directly to accountability, or realigning actions so as to be compatible with 
stated normative commitments, differing processes of exposure and revelation may lead to 
different responses, or realignments, may also take other forms, such as attempting to 
reinterpret (the revealed) actions and norms so as to seem compatible, or even rejecting the 
seemingly violated norms altogether.  Second, the approach introduced here may be applied 
more generally to analyzing how things come to be collectively known.   Reconceptualizing 
exposure as a political and interpretive process, rather than a switch, has potential 
applicability to the explanation of phenomena UDQJLQJIURPKRZDQGZKHQ³ZKLVSHU
QHWZRUNV´FLUFXODWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWVH[XDOKDUDVVHUVWXUQLQWRSXEOLFDFFXVDWLRQVWRKRZ
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a politician who seems to delight in openly breaking norms might suddenly find himself 
under official investigation (Loofborouw, 2019).  Finally, the framework introduced here 
may also enable future work that identifies patterns in how exposures unfold across various 
contexts.  Just as it has been suggested that state secrecy is subject to historical shifts, and 
that the ability of states to maintain secrecy may be declining (Aldrich & Moran, 2019), it is 
possible that exposures may work differently in different contexts, and that the contexts in 
ZKLFKH[SRVXUH³ZRUNV´PD\VKLIWRYHUWLPH This framework for analyzing exposures could 
thus open up a field of analysis of secrecy and exposure as themselves historically contingent 
phenomena.   
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